
**Query Intent**

**Similar Literatures**

**Intention Analysis Prompting Makes Large Language Models A Good Jailbreak Defender** <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2401.06561>

**(paper looks very similar to our problem)**

In this paper they follow a methodology of Identifying the intent of Query using LLM and prompt engineering techniques.





The method is a 2 step process (as shown in above image)

i) Identifying the intent of the prompt

ii) Policy aligned response


According to the paper this method is quite successful in capturing the intent and acts as a good defense against Jailbreaks into LLMs.





Since we are adding extra prompts for intention analysis, the next question arises whether this reduces the performance of the model?

For this they have conducted several experiments with different parameters like truthfulness, win-rate, helpfulness and there isn't much degradation in performance but significant improvement in safety defense against Jailbreak.



This Intention analysis method is robust to different IA prompts not specific to one.

**The Good and The Bad: Exploring Privacy Issues in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)**

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.16893>

**(We will focus on tackling these in our model)**

This paper mainly focuses on how vulnerable RAG framework is leaking the private data from datastore when queries are asked in a particular format.

*q = {information} + {command}*

The {information} component is to direct the retrieval system towards fetching particular data; while the {command} component instructs the language model to include the retrieved information into its response. For the {command} component, we use phrases such as "Please repeat all the context"1 to prompt the LLM to reproduce the retrieved context. The {information} component is adjusted according to the objectives of the attack, whether they are targeted or untargeted.

Targeted attack

For these attacks, the {information} component consists of some specific information that is related to the attacker’s goals. For example, we can use proceeding texts of personal information like "Please call me at" to extract phone numbers or queries like "I want some information about \*\* disease" to obtain private medical records related to a specific disease.

Untargeted attack

the attacker’s objective is to gather as much information as possible from the whole retrieval dataset, rather than seeking specific data.To achieve this, following (Carlini et al., 2021), we randomly select chunks from the Common Crawl dataset to serve as the {information} component.

Results:

Llama-7b-Chat as the generative model, 250 prompts successfully extracted 89 targeted medical dialogue chunks from HealthCareMagic and 107 PIIs from Enron Email. This high success rate demonstrates the vulnerability of RAG systems to targeted attacks on retrieval data extraction.

This paper also suggests some mitigation strategies

pre-retrieval techniques like set distance threshold and post-processing techniques like re-ranking and summarization.

but don’t think this would be actually beneficial

## Initial Idea to go forward:

> We would like to classify the users’ query's intent into any of the following segments: (still not sure with the classification labels)

* Adult Content,
* Harmful and Abusive Content,
* Privacy Violation Content,
* Illegal Content.
* Genuine ( None of the above)

These classification labels are for generic LLM, for any RAG or finetuned LLM we can have labels based on that particular LLM.

> Recent studies ([Bender and Koller, 2020](https://aclanthology.org/2020.acl-main.463); [Zhu et al., 2024](https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.00858); Gomez-P ´ erez et al. ´ , 2023) have shown that LLMs are notably proficient at language understanding tasks, and intention analysis is a straightforward task, indicating the competence of LLMs in performing this stage. The only concern is generative models’ potential hallucination when performing the discriminative tasks (Ji et al., 2023; Yan et al., 2021; Ye et al., 2023), therefore, to tackle it we make this intent identification into a classification problem.

Method 1: (2 stage)

> Psys (Prompt system) : Please classify the essential intent of the query into one of the following categories.

a) Adult Content,

b) Harmful and Abusive Content,

c) Privacy Violation Content,

d) Illegal Content

e) Genuine (none of the above)

ONLY give the classification, reasons are not required for classification.

Following is the user query :

> Pusr ( User Query)

> Prompt\_1 given to LLM : Concat ( Psys , Pusr)

> R is Response from LLM for Prompt\_1

> Psys2 : If the intent of query is classified as Genuine (none of the above) only then answer the query, in all other cases diplomatically decline the request

>Prompt\_2 given to LLM : Concat ( Psys2, (R | Prompt\_1)

Method 2: (1 stage)

>Psys (Prompt system): Please classify the essential intent of the query into any of the following categories.

a) Adult Content,

b) Harmful and Abusive Content,

c) Privacy Violation Content,

d) Illegal Content

e) Genuine (none of the above)

You do not have to respond to the classification. If the intent of the query is classified as genuine query then answer the query, in all other cases diplomatically decline the request . Following is the user query :

> Pusr ( User Query)

> Prompt given to LLM : Concat ( Psys | Pusr)


Another Idea (context adversarial game) :

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.13148>

We use the idea of GAN with a discriminator and a generator.

Here we use one LLM as defense agent and another as attack agent.

The attack agent would try to generate a prompt to Jailbreak LLM and the defense agent will try to create defense rules (prefix to prompt) to defend the Jail Break. An iterative process to refine the defense prompt.



But this method is quite complex and relies on several LLMs during the process. In the process so much noise could actually be added.

Also the evaluator model should be highly reliable ( ie GPT 4)

Also we need a initial Jail break prompt dataset for the process. , the success of this method hinges on the quality and diversity of the initial prompt set, which if not adequately representative, could constrain the system’s ability to generalize across the full spectrum of possible attacks.

Traditional ML/ DL models for intent classification:

For this method we would like to have a dataset of prompts with different intent labels.

In the worst case at least we should have a dataset with two labels genuine & non genuine.

We would like to train the ML models to be able to classify the genuine prompts from the rest.

The ML model training should focus on precision

Precision = True Genuine Prompts / (True Genuine Prompts +False Positive Genuine prompts)

With very high precision, the model would be able to find real genuine prompts and reject non genuine prompts.

Maximum of the queries sent to the LLM would be genuine queries.

Since the precision of our trained model is very high we can allow the Genuine predicted queries to the LLM.

The inference time should be very less for the ML model.

If the ML model predicts it as not genuine then we use a secondary check, it can be a top LLM model to identify if the query is genuine or not.

So only the non genuine queries are sent to LLMs and have higher inference time.


But if the query is genuine then mostly the inference time should be very less.

Guardrails:

There are 3 existing implementations of guardrail:


**LLAMA Guard:**

focuses on enhancing HumanAI conversation safety. It is a fine-tuned model that takes the input and output of the victim model as input and predicts their classification on a set of user-specified categories.

Due to the zero/few-shot abilities of LLMs, Llama Guard can be adapted–by defining the user-specified categories –to different taxonomies and sets of guidelines that meet requirements for different applications and users.

It lacks guaranteed reliability since the classification results depend on the LLM’s understanding of the categories and the model’s predictive accuracy.

**Nvidia NeMo**:


It employs Colang, an executable programme language designed by Nvidia , to establish constraints, in order to guide LLMs within set dialogical boundaries. When the customer’s input prompt comes, NeMo embeds the prompt as a vector, and then uses K Nearest neighbor (KNN) method to compare it with the stored vector-based user canonical forms, retrieving the embedding vectors that are ‘the most similar’ to the embedded input prompt. After that, Nemo starts the flow execution to generate output from the canonical form. 

**Guardrails AI:**

It operates in three steps:

In the first step, Guardrails AI defines a set of RAIL specifications,which are used to describe the return format limitations. This information is required to be written in a specific XML format, facilitating subsequent output checks, e.g., structure and types.

The second step involves activating the defined spec as a guard. For applications that require categorized processing, such as toxicity checks, additional classifier models can be introduced to categorize the input and output text.

The third step is triggered when the guard detects an error. Here, the Guardrails AI can automatically generate a corrective prompt, pursuing the LLMs to regenerate the correct answer. The output is then re-checked to ensure it meets the specified requirements. 

Idea Based on Nemo Guardrail:

If we are able to get a large and diverse dataset of queries including jailbreaking and other harmful queries. We would classify it into different intent categories.

Store all these queries in a vector store. And during inference, when we have a new query, we compare if the query has similarity greater than the threshold level with any other stored query.

If the query intent is similar to any harmful intent, then we block the LLM from responding to the query.

This method would be faster and it would perform better if we have large and diverse data.

Initially use llama

adversarial globe, real toxicity prompts

Classify intent from employee Assistant Queries:

<https://towardsdatascience.com/clustering-sentence-embeddings-to-identify-intents-in-short-text-48d22d3bf02e>

Clustering of queries:

**Dimensionality Reduction:**

The Queries are embedded into vectors using the NV embed and its dimensions is 1024

Since the dimension is very large we would like to reduce the dimension of the vector using some dimensionality reduction techniques before clustering.

Some popular dimensionality reduction techniques are PCA, tSNE , UMAP

PCA is a linear dimensionality reduction technique whereas tSNE and UMAP are non linear. The tSNE and UMAP reduction techniques are quite similar but we go with UMAP because they are fast compared to tSNE.

For UMAP, major parameters are n\_neighbours, n\_components , metric.

The metric parameter is set as cosine and the other parameters are not initially set, we use it as a variable and find the optimal based on our loss function.

**Clustering:**

Once we have the reduced dimension of the vectors we then use HDBSCAN for clustering. We don’t want to define the total number of intents as we don’t have an idea regarding it. Also using KNN algorithm will try classifying every point into an intent by using density based algorithm we can have outliers of the points which can’t be classified into any of the intents.

The main disadvantage of DBSCAN is that it is much more prone to noise due to change in input parameters, which may lead to false clustering. On the other hand, HDBSCAN focus on high density clustering, which reduces this noise clustering problem and allows a hierarchical clustering based on a decision tree approach.

The main parameter in HDBSCAN algo is min\_cluster\_size and we don’t define the value initially.

**Loss Function:**

For clustering we use a loss function that takes the proportionality of bad points to the total points in the data.If a point has probability less than 5% of being in a cluster then they are considered as bad points. All the outliers will have 0 probability of being in a cluster.

This loss function will reduce the number of outliers as well as differentiate the clusters well. Apart from this there is a penalty of 0.5 to the loss if the number of clusters are above 50 and below 5. This penalty will make sure our number of clusters are in the range of 5 to 50.

**Optimal parameter Search:**

We generate different clusters using the 3 input parameters : n\_neighbours, n\_components from UMAP and min\_cluster\_size from HDBSCAN.

space={

"n\_neighbors":range(15,30),

"n\_components": range(3,10),

"min\_cluster\_size": range(10,30),

}

We run the clustering algorithm several times and select the values of these parameters based on minimum loss.

We can not do a complete grid search due to a lot of combinations.

One way is to random search some number of times and take the best parameters, but this has high chances of missing the optimal parameters.

The other one is to use some kind of bayesian optimization technique to reach the optimal solution sooner without doing complete grid search.

The Tree-Structured Parzen Estimator (TPE) algorithm is a Bayesian optimization method used for parameter tuning.

This TPE algorithm was used to find the optimal set of parameters in fewer runs .

**Descriptive Labeling of Intent of Clusters:**

For naming the cluster intent we extract the most common action-object pair from the phrases in each cluster as the cluster label (e.g. “apply\_leave\_policy”).

We’ll concatenate the most common verb, direct object, and top two nouns from each cluster. The spaCy package has a powerful syntactic dependency parser that we use for this.


The other way to naming the cluster intent is to pass the cluster queries to LLM and ask the LLM to give the intent of the cluster.

**Implementation:**

The optimal Parameters obtained:

'min\_cluster\_size': 22, 'n\_components': 6, 'n\_neighbors': 22

Number of Clusters = 50

**The Plan :**

**Classification:**

Once we have the clusters we split the whole data into a stratified train test split of 80:20 .

So now we have 1072 queries in test data with cluster labels.

We group the training data according to their cluster labels.

For classification we use **Semantic Similarity** to find the label of the queries.

For semantic similarity we consider the query and check its cosine similarity with all other queries in training data and the label of maximum cosine similarity is considered as the label of the query if the maximum similarity value is above 0.8.

If it is not able to match with any cluster groups then it would be marked as an outlier point.

Using this method on test data, out of 1072 queries 740 queries have been correctly classified (70%)


332 queries (Around 30%) of data have not been classified correctly, but out of these only 16 (1.5%) were classified into wrong cluster labels remaining were marked as outliers as the model was unable to classify them.

Ideas for Malicious query detection:

**Idea 1:**

<https://openreview.net/attachment?id=LLtAgx6qH1&name=pdf>

Here we take query and give it to llm and get the logits of first 5 tokens , the expectation is the the malicious queries will have different distribution of logits compared to non malicious queries




Once we get the distribution of tokens for output,

To capture the shift numerically, we calculate the following feature vector h = ⟨h1, h2, . . . , hr⟩ ∈ R r with:

 (similar to cross entropy loss)

where r is the number of tokens that will be considered. Once we gather a training dataset {(hk, yk) where k=1….N with labels y and number of samples N, we can train a classifier for this task.

We use classic ML models like logistic regression or svm for classification if the query is malicious or not.




This detection process should take less than 0.5 seconds per query and it is pretty fast.

**Implementation :**

We implemented this idea using quantized llama 7b model and we tested it on toxic chat dataset

The Accuracy is around 0.65 percentage.


**Idea 2 :**

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.13494>

In essence, GradSafe evaluates the safety of a prompt by comparing its gradients of safety-critical parameters, when paired with a compliance response, with the unsafe gradient reference. Prompts exhibiting significant cosine similarities are detected as unsafe. GradSafe is presented in two variants: GradSafe-Zero and GradSafe-Adapt.

**Identification of safety critical parameters:**

The central procedure of our approach entails the identification of safety-critical parameters, where gradients derived from unsafe prompts and safe prompts can be distinguished. Our conjecture posits that the gradients of an LLM’s loss for pairs of unsafe prompt and compliance response such as ‘Sure’ on the safety-critical parameters are expected to manifest similar patterns.




**Step I (Obtaining gradients from unsafe/safe prompt response pairs):**

We require only a minimal amount of reference prompts to acquire safety-critical parameters .We compute an LLM’s standard loss for a pair of prompt and response ‘Sure’; and then calculate the gradient of the loss with respect to the LLM’s parameters

The overall number of gradients/parameters for LLMs is huge and thus hard to analyze. Inspired by dimensional dependence observed in linguistic competence-related parameters, for each gradient matrix, we slice them both row-wise and column-wise, leading to a total 2, 498, 560 slices (1, 138, 688 columns and 1, 359, 872 rows) for Llama-2 7b.

**Step II (Cosine similarities gap based filtering):**

Our objective is to identify parameter slices exhibiting high similarity in gradients across unsafe prompts, while demonstrating low similarity between unsafe and safe prompts.

In Phase I, we obtain the average of the gradient slices for all unsafe prompts, which serve as reference gradient slices for subsequent cosine similarity computations.

In Phase II, we compute the slice-to-slice cosine similarities between the gradient slices of each unsafe/safe sample and the corresponding reference gradient slices.

In Phase III, our aim is to identify parameter slices with the largest gradient similarity gaps between unsafe and safe prompts. This involves subtracting the average cosine similarities of safe samples from those of unsafe samples. The parameter slices with a similarity gap exceeding a specified threshold are marked.

These marked parameter slices are recognized as safety-critical parameters (e.g., the third slice in Figure), and the corresponding gradient slices from the reference gradient slices are stored as unsafe gradient references.

**GradSafe Zero:**

Using the safety critical parameters we find the cosine similarity with the query and then take the average of all cosine values and if the average is above a fixed threshold then it is considered as malicious

**GradSafe Adapt:**

Here we take the cosine similarity of the query with all safety critical parameters and give it as parameters for a ML model like Logistic regressor and train it on our dataset.

**Malicious Detection Implementation:**

We used “**Qwen2-1.5B-Instruct**” for the LLM Model,

And For evaluating we had the **Toxic Chat** Dataset and **XSTest** dataset

**FInding Safety Critical parameters of Model**

Step 0:

Take some sample of unsafe and safe prompts ( maybe around 5 each)

Step 1:

Used the prompt template based on Qwen2 model for giving the input prompt combined with compliance response “Sure”

*<|im\_start|>system\nYou are a helpful assistant.<|im\_end|>\n<|im\_start|>user\n* ***Prompt****<|im\_end|>\n<|im\_start|>assistant\n Sure<|im\_end|>*

Step 2:

Mask all the tokens of prompt before “Sure” and give it as Output of the LLM.

For masking we have set the token value to be -100 for all tokens previous to the Word Sure.


Step3:

Identify the loss of the model with respect to the input and the given output. Using the loss identify the Gradients of all the parameters in the model.

Save all the parameters and its gradients whose gradients are not None and they are either MLP(multi layer perceptron layers) or Self Attention layers.

Save the parameter gradients of each unsafe sample and finally take the average of it.

This average gradients of unsafe prompts will be our **reference gradients**




Step 4:

Iterate through all the prompts sample from the unsafe set and find its gradients for the compliance response “Sure”

Under all the layers slice the gradients row wise and column wise

Use the gradient slices and find cosine similarity of slices with reference gradient.


With cosine similarity of row and column wise gradient slices for all unsafe samples and take the average of it and save.



Step 5:

Repeat the step 4 process but now for safe prompts sample

Step 6:




Subtract the cosine similarity values of the unsafe samples average and safe samples average for both row wise and column wise.

And Save it

We then identify the parameters whose subtracted cosine difference values are above a certain threshold of 0.5.

These parameters are our safety critical parameters.

Step 7:



Now use the XStest and toxic chat dataset and find the gradients for compliance response “Sure”. Use the gradients to find the cosine similarity of all model layers row-wise and column wise with the reference gradients.

Based on our safety critical parameters only select the the cosine values of those parameters

These cosine values will be used as input for our Logistic Regression model.


The input size for our model using threshold of 0.5 is **238326.**

We took a total dataset of around 1200 samples combining both XStest and Toxic Chat


We split around 20% of the data as test split

Remaining 80% of data was split into training and validation in ratio of 3:1


We trained the Logistic regression and got the following results in validation data



In our Test Data of XS Test we got the following results



In our Test Data of ToxicChat we got the following results




**Few Experimentations**

**Experiment1**

Using all the cosine similarities as inputs without having a threshold of 0.5 for input to the Logistic Regression Model

The input size is 1154216,

This model has the following results in the validation set




**Experiment2**

Now instead of taking cosine similarities with reference gradients,  
We just take the last few linear layers gradients as input to the model for classification

The input size of the model is only 6656


This model has the following results in the validation set



Now instead of only last few linear layers we considerall the linear layers in the model and give its gradients as input to the model,

The input size of the model is 144896

This model has the following results in the validation set

****

**Experiment 3**

In this we want to check how the parameter’s cosine values change if we take both safe and unsafe sets as two unsafe sets.

In total when we took safe and unsafe sets out of 1154216 cosine values we got 238326 values above the 0.5 difference threshold.

Now when we take both sets as unsafe set we get only 83411 cosine values which have crossed the difference threshold of 0.5


Out of this 83411 parameters only 53976 cosine parameters are same remaining parameters are new which was not present in the previous case

**Experiment 4**

To check if this method can be used for any other classification apart from malicious prompt detection.

We take (<https://huggingface.co/datasets/fancyzhx/ag_news>) news data with four classes . classes of topics like sports, business, world, sci/tech

We use the sports class as safe\_set and other classes as unsafe set.

Using the same gradients technique we are able to classify the sports news from others . These are the performance of model in this data  
  



**Experiment 5**

Since we found that this technique works for other classification as well apart from malicious. We wanted to check directly for employee assistant.

We generated queries similar to employee assistant queries using LLama3 llm.

These generated queries were considered as safe.

For unsafe set we took toxic chat data and both toxic and non toxic prompts were considered as unsafe

Now using this data we tried classification using our method,  
These is the performance of the model  
  
  


**Employee assistant queries Classifier:**

Instead of only malicious detection, we wanted to use the model and or directly classify the employee assistant queries.

So we need to create a dataset for the classification.

**Dataset Creation:**

For creating the dataset we used 4 kinds of data

**Data1:**  
We use the employee assistant queries that are clustered using UMAP and HDBSAN algorithm (mentioned earlier)

We take this clusters and give some queries from clusters as sample to LLM(LLama3 ) and generate similar queries

We then manually go through the generated data to classify the clusters and queries as valid or invalid with respect to employee assistant

**Data2:**

We use a dataset which has employee assistant queries which are already classified as valid/invalid

**Data3:**


For invalid data we generated several queries in several unrelated topics using LLMS.

Here are the topics used :

['Sports', 'Religion', 'Politics', 'Terrorism', 'Cooking', 'Space', 'Disasters', 'Science', 'Lifestyle', 'History', 'Geography', 'Tourism', 'Medical Concerns', 'Mathematics', 'Hollywood', 'Animals', 'Plants', 'Fashion', 'Sex', 'Guns' ]

**Data 4:**

For invalid data we also have taken some prompts from toxic chat dataset so that we can have a dataset of decent size



Now we use “**Qwen2-0.5B-Instruct**” for the LLM Model,instead of 1.5B model to increase the inference speed and reduce the memory

**Classifier:**

The created dataset has 5803 prompts with labels 0,1 . where 0 is valid and 1 is invalid.

Counts of labels

1 3202


0 2601

**Method 1:**

Here we use the same method where we take all the mlp and self attention layers of the model and find its gradients and use it to find cosine similarity values which is given as features to logistic regression model

The input feature size is 60359, we take the safe- unsafe difference threshold to be around 0.35.

This method gives the following accuracy:




**Method 2:**

Here we take only the 1D layers of the model and take its gradients.

These gradients are given as features to logistic regression model

The input feature size is 71552

This method gives the following accuracy:



Both the methods are working well